It may appear that there are many reasons for vegetarianism based on animal suffering in the philosophical literature. These reasons, however, end up supporting veganism rather than vegetarianism. The question of whether vegetarianism has any merits is examined in this chapter. Some of the motivations for vegetarianism don’t seem to be the kinds of things that may serve as the basis of a moral argument since they tend to be highly personal. Arguments regarding vegetarianism as a “middle way” between veganism and omnivorism, however, are very dependent, even though they could have some merit. Therefore, the vegetarian may find both of these options to be unsatisfactory. Is vegetarianism a morally sound position? The only philosopher who has made a strong case for vegetarianism over veganism is Tzachi Zamir, but a careful analysis of his arguments reveals that they are not as strong as they initially appear to be. One other possibility is that there could be grounds against eating animal flesh and/or body parts that are unrelated to worries about the damage that animals endure during the creation of food. These reasons, which have been alluded to in animal ethics, criticize the intake of meat but do not necessarily criticize the consumption of eggs and dairy. Therefore, they could serve as the foundation for a moral argument for vegetarianism that does not instantly turn into a case for veganism. If such an argument can be made, the repercussions are not straightforward.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14504-0_135